This paper investigates the relationship between countries' scal balances and current accounts with an emphasis on the role of scal rules. The direct eect of scal policy on the current account via aggregate (import) demand is potentially amplied by indirect eects, materializing through interest rate eects and inter-generational transfers that reduce savings. On the other hand, the implied positive relation between scal and external balances is potentially attenuated by osetting changes in savings through Ricardian equivalence considerations. We expect this attenuation eect to be stronger in countries with more stringent scal rules and test this hypothesis using a panel of 73 countries over the period . As previous studies we nd a positive eect of scal balances on the current account, supporting the twin decit hypothesis. However, the eect of scal balances on the current account depends on the stringency of scal (budget balance or debt) rules in place; it is reduced by one third on average and virtually eliminated for countries with the most stringent scal rules.
Introduction
There is a large number of studies investigating the twin decit hypothesis on the link between scal and external balances. Recently this topic has received additional attention, given the need of many countries for adjustments of both the scal and external balance in the wake of the nancial an economic crisis. The standard rationale for the twin decit hypothesis is that a government's scal decit occurs together with a current account decit through demand, interest rate and real exchange rate eects. Numerous empirical studies on the determinants of the current account have conrmed the positive relation between scal balances and current accounts. Most studies so far have assumed the relationship between scal and external balances to be homogeneous across countries; to the best of our knowledge none of the previous studies has considered the role of scal rules, which can aect both scal and external balances and the relationship between them. The public nance literature (see, e.g., Poterba (1994) , Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) , Canova and Pappa (2006) and Fabrozio and Mody (2006) ) shows that scal frameworks, characterized, e.g., by stringent budget and ecient auditing processes, can help to reduce scal decits. And as outlined in more detail below, scal rules may have further eects on the current account operating through channels other than the scal balance (such as interest rates and savings). Against this background, scal rules may be an important variable to be considered in empirical studies on the twin decit hypothesis, or more generally, the relation between scal and external balances.
The present study builds on standard empirical models on the determinants of the current account (Lee et al. 2008 , Prat et al. 2010 , and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2012 and augments these models by considering the role of scal rules. Based on a theoretical discussion of the potential linkages between scal rules, scal balances, and current accounts, we use a panel of 73 countries over the period 1985-2012 to test for both direct eects of scal rules on the current account and also consider, whether more stringent scal rules aect the relationship between the scal balance and the current account. Thereby, we make use of a novel dataset on the stringency of scal rules developed in Badinger and Reuter (2014) .
There are three main results: i) Conrming the results of previous studies, we nd a positive relationship between the scal balance and the current account. ii) There is no signicant direct eect of scal rules on the current account. iii) The magnitude of the eect of the scal balance on the current account is signicantly reduced, when stringent balanced budget or debt rules are in place.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the theoretical background, Section 3 describes the corresponding empirical model. Section 4 provides a description of the data and the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 5 summarizes the estimation results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background 2.1 Twin Decits: The Link between Budget and External Balances A standard textbook representation (e.g., Obstfeld et al. 1996) of the current account is given by
where CA is the current account, S and I are private savings and investments, and (T −G) the scal balance (savings) of the public sector (taxes minus government spending).
The literature often attributes changes in the current account to public sector (in)stability, as private savings and investments are relatively stable in the medium run (see, e.g., Krugman 1979) . The relationship between CA and (T −G) is usually assumed (and empirically found) to be positive, which is discussed under the heading`twin decits' of scal and external balances. In addition to the`direct' eect implicit in Eq. (1) (higher public expenditures lead to increased imports through higher demand), the literature presents arguments for`indirect' eects of the scal balance on the current account.
The distinction between direct and indirect eects is somewhat imprecise, since strictly speaking all eects of scal on external balances are indirect. In the present context, we dene indirect eects as those materializing through channels other than income related changes in import demand.
The rst of these indirect eects materializes through the interest rate channel; scal balances and interest rates are usually (and especially for small economies) negatively related. E.g., in case of a scal expansion, higher interest rates are triggered by an increase in total demand and the nancing of budget decits by bonds issuance (Kumar and Baldacci 2010) , which induces capital inows and leads to an appreciation of the domestic currency and thus lower net exports.
Second, Obstfeld et al. (1996) , using an overlapping generations model, show that scal decits lead to a redistribution of income from future to present generations, thereby decreasing savings and thus negatively aecting the current account. This relationship is stronger the more agents are liquidity constrained. Both channels are expected to amplify the direct eect of the scal balance on the current account, increasing the magnitude of their (positive) relationship. There is one potentially important channel counteracting the emergence of twin decits by weakening the eect of the scal balance on the current account. In models using the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis (e.g., Barro 1989) an increase in budget decits will be oset by an increase in private savings because the private sector fully discounts future tax liabilities associated with the scal decit.
3 If Ricardian equivalence is incomplete, the eect of the scal balance on the current account will be reduced rather then eliminated.
Fiscal Institutions and Twin Decits
The stringency of scal frameworks is expected to inuence the current account in several ways: Obviously, scal rules may aect the current account through their eect on scal balances. Several empirical studies suggest that stringent scal frameworks (in terms of budget preparation, implementation, rules, transparency requirements) have a positive eect on the scal balance (e.g., Von Hagen 1992, Bohn and Inman 1996 , Alesina et al. 1999 , Gleich 2003 , Hallerberg 2003 , Wagner 2003 , Filc and Scartascini 2004 , Debrun et al. 2008 , Nerlich and Reuter 2013 . However, since scal balances are included as a key explanatory variable in our empirical model on the determinants of the current account, this channel is not subject of the present study.
In addition, scal rules may aect the current account through channels other than the scal balance. i) Stricter scal frameworks may increase the trust of agents into scal forecasts, medium-term budgetary plans and the sustainability of public nances. This leads to lower uncertainty about future scal policy and decreases precautionary savings of the agents. ii) Several studies have shown that stringent scal institutions lead to lower interest rates on government bonds and thus lower interest rates in general (see Johnson and Kriz 2005 , Hallerberg and Wol 2008 , and Iara and Wol 2014 . One the one hand, this reduces foreign direct investment and capital ows; on the other hand, it boosts consumption and investment and leads to a depreciation of the currency (see Baxter 1995 and Abbas et al. 2011) . These (potentially osetting) eects suggest a possible direct relationship between scal rules and current accounts, though the relevance and direction of the net eect is ambiguous and remains to be determined empirically.
iii) Finally, scal rules may aect the current account through Ricardian equivalence, operating through the eect of scal decits on private savings and thus the current account as evident from Eq. (1). The stricter scal institutions are (or agents believe they are), the stronger should be the reaction of private agents to changes in public nances. E.g., with stricter scal rules, an increase in a government's expenditures is more likely to be met by a decrease in expenditures or increases in taxes in the future, and private agents will thus increase their savings in anticipation to future changes in scal policy.
These arguments regarding the eects of scal institutions on the current account and the channels constituting the twin decit theories warrant an inclusion of variables measuring the stringency of scal rules in empirical models of the current account. The aforementioned eects of scal rules on the current account materializing through channels i) and ii) can be regarded as direct eects of scal rules, i.e., eects unrelated to the twin decit channels, materializing independently and also without a change in the scal balance.
In contrast, channel iii), reecting Ricardian equivalence considerations, is relevant only if there is a change in the scal balance and may thus be termed as indirect eect of scal rules on the current account.
As with the eects of the scal balance on the current account, the distinction between direct and indirect eects of scal rules is moot, since all eects of scal rules are indirect in the sense that they operate through intermediate channels. Notwithstanding these semantic subtleties, the discussion above has several testable implications that will be taken up in the empirical analysis on the determinants of the current account. First, as it is standard in the literature, we expect a positive eect of the scal balance on the current account, which comprises both direct and indirect eects in the sense dened above.
Second, we will test for both direct eects of scal rules on the current account (channels i) and ii)), as well as whether scal rules have an indirect eect on the magnitude of the relationship between the scal balance and the current account (channel iii)). The latter eect reects the hypothesis that stricter scal rules enhance Ricardian features of an economy, thereby osetting demand side eects of changes in the scal stance on the external balance and hence attenuating the twin-decit relation. In other words, the more stringent scal rules are, the smaller the eect of the scal balance on the current account.
Estimation Framework
Before investigating the eect of scal rules, we re-estimate specications used in recent empirical studies on the twin decit (Lee et al. 2008 , Prat et al. 2010 , and Lane and MilesiFerretti 2012 ) using a larger dataset with more cross-sectional observations (at least 73 countries, compared with 54 in Lee et al. 2008 , 33 in Prat et al. 2010 and 65 in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2012 ) and a more recent time period (1985-2012 compared with 1973-2004 in Lee et al. 2008 , 1970 -2008 in Prat et al. 2010 and 1969 -2008 in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2012 . Equation (2) shows our baseline empirical model on the determinants of the current account, which is in line with previous studies:
where CA i,t is the current account of country i in year t and BB i,t is the scal balance (both variables expressed relative to GDP); η i denotes country-specic xed eects and ε i,t is the idiosyncratic error term. The vector x i,t includes a set of control variables, as suggested by Lee et al. (2008) , Prat et al. (2010) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) , which can be grouped into two subsets: determinants of saving/investment and structural control variables. The set of determinants of saving and investment contains ve variables: i) two age dependency ratios (less than 25 and more than 65 years old), as suggested in Gudmundsson and Zoega (2014) , to control for dierent saving-patterns depending on the age structure of a country's population; ii) the stock of net foreign assets (N F A), following Lee et al. (2008) , to control for whether a) a country is wealthy (high stock of N F A) and can aord decits and therefore a lower trade balance or b) a country receives high net foreign income ows improving the current account; iii) population growth, measuring the extent to which a country will a have young work force in the future, which is expected to have smaller savings; iv) GDP growth, as proxy for new income potentials and perhaps reduced saving behaviour (worsening the current account) and v) income relative to the US, as a proxy of a country's development stage (as already emphasized in Obstfeld et al. (1996) , large developed countries have a lower saving-investment balance than developing countries, thus implying a negative eect on the current account).
The set of structural control variables contains: i) the ratio of foreign direct investment (F DI) to output as suggested in Prat et al. (2010) (which should have a negative eect on the current account since F DI allows a more sustainable nancing of decits); ii) the ratio of net exports of oil to output (controlling for oil-exporter countries whose current account balances strongly depend on oil prices); and iii) the terms of trade that helps to account for world market prices (which are expected to have a positive eect).
Additionally, three dummy variables are included: i) a Eurozone crisis dummy, controlling for the 2008-2011 nancial crisis and the following disruption in access to capital markets (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2012, p.8 ; expected to have a positive eect on the current account); ii) an Asian crisis dummy for the 1997-2000 Asian nancial crisis (expected to be positively correlated with the current account due to the macroeconomic contraction); and iii) a nancial center dummy, accounting for countries being a major actor in nancial trade (expected to have a positive eect on the current account).
After re-estimating and comparing the baseline model replicating the specications in previous studies, we investigate the`direct' and`indirect' eects of scal rules on the current account. In particular, Eq. (2) is augmented by adding measures of the stringency of scal rules (F R) as explanatory variable and its interaction with the scal balance (BB i,t × F R i,t ):
The parameter ρ represents the direct eect of scal rules on the current account, which is ambiguous from a theoretical perspective as outlined above. Since the eect of BB on CA is given by β + φF R, the parameter φ reects the indirect eect of scal rules on the (relation between the scal balance and the) current account. Assuming the twin decit hypothesis holds (β > 0), the discussion above would suggest that the sign of φ is negative, i.e., more stringent scal rules reduce the eect of the scal balance on the current account. Finally, since we do not expect all eects of the scal balance and scal rules to materialize contemporaneously, we also consider a dynamic version of Eq.(3), which includes one lag of the dependent variable (CA i,t−1 ).
Data
Data on the countries' scal balances and current accounts are from the World Economic Outlook database (IMF 2014) , data source of the control variables is the World Development Indicators Database (World Bank 2014) . The appendix provides a detailed description of the variables, the data sources, as well as summary statistics (Tables A1 and A2) .
As measures of the stringency of scal rules we use data from Badinger and Reuter (2014) and Bachtrögler et al. (2014) . They derive measures for the stringency of scal rules, based on the IMF scal rules database, which covers national and supranational numerical scal rules in 81 countries from 1985-2012. It provides information on the type of scal rules as well as their characteristics, such as the legal basis, enforcement, coverage, escape clauses, provisions for cyclical adjustments and supporting features like independent monitoring bodies or scal responsibility laws. From a methodological perspective, they use partially ordered set (POSET) theory, which provides an attractive approach to rank objects based on ordinal properties without assigning subjective weights (as usually done in a composite index approach).
In the present study, we will consider two alternative indices of the most common scal rules: i) budget balance rules (F R BR ) aiming at balancing the scal budget or keeping it within certain boundaries, ii) debt rules (F R DR ) aiming at stabilising or reducing public debt. Each scal rule index ranges from 0 and 1 and is increasing in stringency, broadly dened in terms of their hierarchy of the legal basis, coverage, and transparency and accountability. Summary statistics are given in Table A2 in the Appendix.
Results
We split the discussion of our results into three parts. First, we compare the least squares dummy variables (LSDV) estimates of the standard specication from previous studies given by Eq. (2) with those obtained for our extended sample of 73 countries over the period . Second, we turn to the LSDV estimates of the augmented model including our our measures of scal rules as described in Eq. (3). Third, we estimate the dynamic variant of Eq. (3) using a generalized methods of moments (GMM)approach and provide several robustness checks.
Basic Model
We begin by re-estimating the empirical models used in previous studies (Lee et al. 2008 , Prat et al. 2010 , and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2012 to set the stage for adding further variables and check if the results hold up for a larger sample of countries and the most recent time period. Columns (1) to (3) of Table 1 show the coecients as reported in the respective studies. According to their results, a one percentage point of GDP increase in the scal balance leads to a 0.19 (in Lee et al. 2008 ), 0.48 (in Prat et al. 2010 ) and 0.28 (in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2012) percentage point of GDP increase in the current account.
Columns (4) and (5) use the same set of variables but a larger cross-section of 160 countries and time periods 1985-2008 and 1985-2012 respectively. Overall, the results obtained in previous studies holds up for our dataset, particularly the parameter estimate of the scal balance, which is of main interest in the present context. The coecient of BB is statistically signicant and positive, conrming a positive association between the scal balance and current account. In terms of magnitude, the coecients amount to 0.147 (column (4)) and 0.203 (column (5)), which is in the lower range of the eects obtained in previous studies.
[ Table 1 here]
Adding Fiscal Institutions
As a next step, we investigate whether the stringency of scal rules directly or indirectly aects the current account through the channels discussed in Section 2. Table 2 reports the LSDV estimates of the baseline model (Eq. (2)) and the extended model (Eq. (3)) including scal rules. First, we test for direct eects of scal balance and debt rules by including the variables F R BR and F R DR respectively. Second, we also test for indirect eects of both types of scal rules (on the eect of the scal balance on the current account) by adding interaction terms between the scal balance and the respective scal rule, i.e., BB × F R BR and BB × F R DR respectively.
This yields ve models: a baseline model without scal rules (column (1)), two models for budget balance rules (column (2a) and column (2b)) and two models for debt rules (column (3a) and column (3b)), all of which are estimated for the same (unbalanced) panel of 73 countries from 1985-2012, which is determined by availability of data on scal rules.
The twin decit hypothesis is once again conrmed by the positive and signicant coecients of the scal balance, which range from 0.186 and 0.212. Due to the smaller country sample (73 countries in Table 2 instead of 160 countries in Table 1 ), some changes in the estimates of the control variables can be observed. Age dependency ratios, oil balance and the dummy controlling for the Asia crisis have no statistically signicant impact on the current account anymore.
6 Furthermore, the eect of net foreign assets (N F A) is reversed and remains only moderately signicant at the 10% level. Finally, relative income becomes signicant and shows the expected negative eect on the current account (see Prat et al. 2010) . In the present context, the variables of main interest are the two scal rule indices (F R BR , F R DR ), representing their direct eect, and their interaction terms with the scal balance (BB × F R BR , BB × F R DR ), representing their indirect eects on the current account. The direct eects of scal rules, when included alone turn out signicant at 10 percent (F R BR , column (2a)) or insignicant (F R DR , column (3a)); when included along with the interaction terms, both variables are rendered insignicant. This suggests that scal rules themselves do not appear to be signicantly associated with the current account. In contrast, the indirect eects of scal rules (on the eect of the scal balance on the current account) show a signicant negative eect; this holds for both budget balance rules (column (2b)) and debt rules (column (3b)). Evaluated at the sample mean of F R BR (F R DR ), the coecient linking the scal balance to the current account is reduced from 0.212 to 0.159 (from 0.203 to 0.156); for countries with the most stringent scal rules the eect is reduced to 0.010 (-0.105), which is not signicantly dierent from zero. This implies that the eect of the scal balance on the current account is not homogeneous but diers across countries, and that scal institutions turn out to be an important driver of the cross-country heterogeneity. Stringent scal rules weaken the link between the scal balance and the current account, for countries with the most stringent scal rules the eect of the scal balance is virtually eliminated.
[ Table 2 here] 5.3 Dynamic Specication and Robustness Table 3 contains the estimation results of the dynamic version of the Eq. (3) for budget balance and debt rules. All models are estimated by the two-step generalized method of moments estimator in rst-dierences by Arellano and Bond (1991) . For the purpose of testing the robustness of the results, three specications are considered for both budget balance rules (columns (1a4a)) and debt rules (columns (1b4b)): First, we re-estimate the specication in columns (1a1b), restricting the time period up to 2007, excluding the nancial and economic crisis (columns (2a2b)). We next exclude observations where the current account exceeds the thresholds of -15% and 15% of GDP (columns (3a 3b)); nally, columns (4a4b) exclude outliers dened as observations with standardized residuals larger than two. As in the static models, the coecient of the scal balance turns out positive and signicant; the estimated short-run eects range from 0.113 to 0.209, the long-run eects implied by the dynamic specication from 0.229 to 0.363. The results from the LSDV estimates in Table 2 regarding the direct and indirect eects of budget balance and debt rules on the current account are overall conrmed by the seven GMM specications. Direct eects of scal rules on the current account (F BR and F DR ) turn out statistically insignicant once their indirect eect is accounted for. And as with the LSDV estimates, indirect eects of scal rules are negative and statistically signicant throughout. The estimates of the indirect eect range from -0.080 to -0.268 for budget balance rules and from -0.296 to -0.462 for debt rules. In terms of magnitude, averaged over all specications and evaluated at the sample mean of the respective scal rule, budget balance (debt) rules reduce the estimated long-run eect of the scal balance on the current account from 0.286 to 0.210 (0.265 to 0.169).
[ Table 3 here] 6 Concluding Remarks This paper investigates the relationship between scal and external balances with an emphasis on the role of scal rules. If Ricardian equivalence is incomplete, one would expect scal decits to translate partly into current account decits through reduced savings. The hypothesis considered in this paper is that credible scal rules may enforce Ricardian features of economies, thereby reducing the eect of scal policy on the current account.
Accordingly, we test for direct eects of scal rules on the current account as well as for indirect eects of scal rules on the relationship between the scal balance and the current account, using a panel of 73 countries over the period 1985-2012 and indices on the stringency of budget balance and debt rules.
In line with previous studies, we conrm a positive association between the scal balance and the current account, which is supportive of the twin decit hypothesis. Regarding the role of scal rules, we nd no robust evidence for a direct eect on the current account. However, the interaction between scal rules and the scal balance turns out to have a statistically and economically signicant eect on the current account: Stringent balanced budget and debt rules reduce the eect of the scal balance on the current account by roughly one third on average, for countries with the most stringent scal rules, the eect of the scal balance on the current account is essentially eliminated.
As a consequence, eective and stringent scal rules, besides their direct eect on the scal balance, can play a role as automatic stabilizers of the current account by dampening a deterioration (improvement) of the current account during periods of scal decits (consolidations). Notes: Dependent variable is current account relative to GDP (CA); country xed eects are included in all specications; robust standard errors in parentheses; signicance levels: 1%, 5%, 10%.
(1) Lee et al. (2008) , no standard errors are reported, (2) Prat et al. (2010) , (3) Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) , (4) 
